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RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0008
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0012
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0022
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0027
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0008
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RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000105

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DEP FOR SCA
DIA FOR DHO2
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5
SOCCENT FOR J33

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MASS](#) [OVIP](#) [TI](#)
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DUSHANBE REQUEST FOR FY08
USCENTCOM/SOCCENT COUNTER NARCO TERRORISM TRAINING EVENTS

REF: A. SECDEF APPROVAL FOR FY2008 SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES (SOF) DEPLOYMENTS

[1](#)B. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS)
INSTRUCTIONS 3710.01/28MAY93 FOR
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR APPROVING
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO DRUG AND/OR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND COUNTER-DRUG
RELATED DEPLOYMENT OF US DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE (DOD) PERSONNEL

[1](#)C. 07 DUSHANBE 1750 (DTG 140855Z DEC 07)

[1](#)D. 07 DUSHANBE 1751 (DTG 140855Z DEC 07)

[1](#)E. 08 STATE 1643 (DTG 072104Z JAN 08)

[1](#)F. 08 STATE 1980 (DTG 081918Z JAN 08)

Classified By: Tom Hushek, CDA, U.S. Embassy Dushanbe, STATE;
REASON: 1.4 (a) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary. In accordance with REFs A and B, this message is an Embassy Dushanbe request for FY08 DOD operational support under 1004, National Defense Authorization Act 1991, as amended for development of Counter Narco Terrorism (CNT) training deployments CTJ2008NT023W (2nd Qtr) and CTJ2008NT044M (4th Qtr) with the National Guard Special Forces (SF) Battalion and CTJ2008NT024W (2nd Qtr) and CTJ2008NT045M (4th Qtr) with the Border Guard SF Battalion.

[1](#)2. (U) U.S. agency requesting CNT events. This request has been approved by the Embassy, Dushanbe Acting Chief of Mission and is made through the Embassy Dushanbe, Acting Drug Enforcement Agency Country Officer (DEA CO), Mr. Paul Hackett and was coordinated with Embassy Dushanbe,s Border Law Enforcement Working Group (BLEWG).

[1](#)3. (C) Partner Nation (PN) organizations requesting these events. GEN-MAJ Rajabali Rahmanili and GEN-MAJ Sherali Mirzo, Commanders of the Tajik National Guard and Border Guards respectively have requested that their SF battalions receive the proposed training.

Justification for the CNT Training

¶4. (C) Narcotics, ultimately destined for the U.S. and other international markets are transshipped from Afghanistan through Tajikistan. Embassy Dushanbe reporting concerning transit/trafficking activity in Central and South Asia indicates that past and current levels of narcotics trafficking activity in Tajikistan are significant and are likely to increase in conjunction with this year's poppy harvest in Afghanistan. The funds generated from the sale of narcotics are likely used to support terrorist activity and organized crime. These are destabilizing factors in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

¶5. (C) The Tajik National Guard and Border Guards Special Forces battalions, among other agencies, are the primary Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) special operations capable forces in Tajikistan. The continuation of the CENTCOM, SOCCENT and Embassy Dushanbe CNT training program, as part of the overall Foreign Internal Defense (FID) strategy and program for Tajikistan, would expand and increase the development of a strong combined and unified U.S./Tajik effort in disrupting the escalation of illegal narcotics Qeffort in disrupting the escalation of illegal narcotics smuggled through Central Asia and in denying insurgents and terrorists access to a critical funding source for continued terrorist and insurgent operations in Tajikistan and the region.

¶6. (C) A tactical CNT program promotes greater regional stability, decreases the amount of illegal narcotics transiting through Tajikistan and Central Asia to international markets in the Russia, Europe and the United States and is an indirect approach for defeating international terrorism and insurgents that threaten the

stability of Tajikistan and the region. In the post 9/11 environment, a Tajik CNT capability has become more critical in combating terrorist/narcotic activity and supports USCENTCOM theater objectives for security cooperation and both CENTCOM,s and the U.S. Special Operations Command,s (USSOCCOM) regional and global war on terrorism.

¶7. (C) Critical training tasks that both the Tajik National Guard and Border Guards have requested include the following: staff organization and planning, orders production, mission analysis and the military decision making process, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), direct action (raids and ambushes), special reconnaissance, close quarters combat/battle (CQC/B), sniper/observe operations, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE), tactical communications and basic combat life saving.

¶8. (C) Embassy Dushanbe requests that pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) and/or assessments be scheduled for all events. Both the National Guard and Border Guard SF Battalions have requested detailed training schedules and programs of instruction (POI) be provided following each PDSS. Training will be conducted at the Fakhrabad and Lahur training areas in Tajikistan. Other training locations within Tajikistan may be designated by the host nation.

Rules of Engagement

¶10. (C) CJCS standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) are in effect. Deploying forces will not under any circumstances accompany U.S. DEA, or PN counter-parts on actual CNT field operations or participate in any activity in which hostilities are imminent. Embassy Dushanbe Country Team further understands that units and individuals deployed outside the United States, its territories and possessions will deploy with assigned weapons and ammunition, whenever possible. When carrying weapons is not required in country, the weapons will be stored in a secure location which provides reasonable access. Any change in carry condition

will be coordinated with the RSO. Diplomatic plated vehicles will be used for transport of all weapons to and from training locations.

¶11. (C) Justification. US SOF units and individuals must be capable of providing their own force protection when forward deployed in all threat environments. Embassy Dushanbe Regional Security Officer (RSO) Mr. Seth Green, is the coordinating official for all weapons, ammunition and other sensitive items issues. Mr. Green can be contacted at the Embassy Dushanbe at comm: 992 37 229 2901 or 992 93 570 0020 or by unclass email at greense@state.gov or class email at greense@state.sgov.gov.

Human Rights Verification

¶12. REFTELS C and D are Embassy Dushanbe,s Leahy Human Rights Vetting Requests for the Border Guards and National Guard SF Battalions, respectively. REFTELS E and F are the QGuard SF Battalions, respectively. REFTELS E and F are the responses to these requests stating that the Department of State possesses no credible information of gross violations of human rights by the identified units and commanders.

Points of Contact for Training

¶13. Defense and Army Attache, Embassy Dushanbe, LTC Daniel ¶R. Green is responsible for assisting the CNT team with issues while they are in Tajikistan. DEA Dushanbe Country Office, Acting Country Attach Paul Hackett will be kept informed of any issues should they arise.

¶14. (U) Any questions concerning this message or CNT training should be directed to the Defense Attache, LTC Daniel Green at 992-37-229-2701 or 992-93-570-7030 or the DEA Acting Country Attach Paul Hackett at 992 37 224 2807 or 992 93 570 7095.
HUSHEK